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THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN
CIVIC SPHERE
THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION: CIVIC VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES
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CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. By Elizabeth
Beaumont. 1 Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. xvi + 343.
$49.95.
PEOPLING THE CONSTITUTION. John E. Finn. 2
University Press of Kansas, 2014. Pp. xv + 350. $39.95.
Mariah Zeisberg 3
Do citizens alter, transform, remake, and authorize their fundamental law only outside of a particular regime, or from within
it as well? What forms of political agency have citizens in the U.S.
constitutional polity used in the past to achieve these ends, and
which offer themselves today? What is the role of radical critique
and radical action in the development of certain hegemonic binaries like “public” and “private,” “free” and “slave,” the “social”
and the “political”? Beyond winning electoral victories or suing
for their rights, how else can and do movements transform political structures, ideas, and outcomes in the U.S.?
In a polity whose foundational referent is a text—the U.S.
Constitution—these questions about public mobilization and political life are also questions about the links between civic life and
the ongoing authority of a constitutional project. Civic life is so
important because, in John Finn’s words, the “main principles of
constitutional architecture, such as the principle of checks and
balances, [are] mere parchment barriers but for their grounding
in a civic culture that regards them as valuable and insists upon
some measure of fidelity to them by political actors and citizens”
(p. 85). Both of these works—The Civic Constitution and Peopling
1.
2.
3.
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the Constitution—interrogate the civic conditions that rest behind
the ongoing authority of a constitutional order.
The contribution of both works should be understood from
within a paradigm set by two field-defining theoretic propositions:
Bruce Ackerman’s notion of constitutional dualism and Larry
4
Kramer’s constitutional populism. Bruce Ackerman’s idea of
constitutional “dualism” describes constitutional authority as a
creation of citizens who use legal tools—most especially voting,
petitioning, and assembling—to periodically influence elite repre5
sentatives to transform the Constitution’s practical meaning. For
Kramer, constitutional publics have, in an ongoing way—as voters, jurors, mobs, legislatures, and town halls—been able to mobilize to seize authority over constitutional meaning and espe6
cially to seize it away from judges. Both of these approaches are
useful, but both have limits. Many have challenged the periodicity
of Ackerman’s account, as well as the implication that, in John
Finn’s words, “[i]n most moments . . . citizens have little obligation
to tend to the Constitution or even to public life” (p. 99). Kramer’s
work obscures the organizational features of the public’s collective action because Kramer never defines who “the people” are,
how they may be recognized, or the processes and structures
through which they exercise political agency.
Beaumont and Finn have written substantial books that
begin to address these problems. For Finn, citizens make the Constitution authoritative by using its text in their deliberations; reasoning about the public good; tending to civic life; arguing and resisting; and voting and petitioning too. Finn’s ideal constitutional
citizens are highly mobilized, highly educated extraverts, not content to register their preferences in a voting booth or sue for their
rights, but instead demanding that the public spaces around them
engage constitutionalist values almost relentlessly. His key category is “tending”: citizens tend to a constitutional order when they
are committed in an active, ongoing way centered on everyday
“practices of care” which are grounded in “a specific kind of
knowledge, one grounded in the practice of politics and practical
experience” (p. 26). For Beaumont, practices of civic deliberation
themselves create citizens. In The Civic Constitution, deliberation
is the work that unauthorized subjects (colonists, women, slaves)
4. BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993); LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004).
5. ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 10–16.
6. KRAMER, supra note 4, at 208–13.
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do to transform themselves into recognized constitutional agents.
Beaumont calls this a power of “civic founding” (pp. 5–8). Arguing that the Constitution contains no “self-correcting” mechanism
(p. 22), Beaumont shows that scholars seeking to understand the
ongoing meaning of constitutional text over time should study the
citizens whose ideas and actions have transformed public meanings of the text and the structures and the forms of agency through
which citizens have claimed and exercised this civic power (pp. 11,
14). Their practices of self-authorization led them to speak in contexts that they were barred from, to sit in areas of exclusion, to
use bazaars, fairs, newspaper publications, petitions and assemblies, and most essentially peaceful confrontation to argue for and
perform their visions of politics to others. From her discussions of
the use of free speech by “common men” (p. 31), to her exposure
of the early uses of boycotts and non-importation agreements for
revolutionary politics (p. 53), her excavation of “debtors’ constitutionalism” (p. 77) and the radical practice of suffragists (chapter
5), Beaumont brings attention to how citizen advocates have been
driven to “self-authoriz[e]” themselves (p. 150) to address problems that their fellows were only too ready to suppress.
For both authors, this “founding” or “tending” can happen
almost anywhere: pie-baking circles and the PTA, workplaces and
jury boxes, as well as “letters to the editor, farmers’ markets, coffee houses, barbershops, supermarkets, and a nearly endless variety of so-called third spaces” (Finn, p. 14). When citizens use constitutional language, institutions, and values for advocacy,
contestation, and deliberation, then according to these authors,
they are sustaining constitutional authority.
The works have a number of important similarities that will,
I hope, become ordinary in this field. Both authors move past accounts of political authority rooted in ideological, cultural, or reasoned unanimity. They instead are careful to insist that the Constitution can be authoritative even when, or perhaps especially
when, its meaning and even value are contested. Indeed contestation is one of the major processes through which a constitution
becomes relevant in public life. For Finn, a faithful civic constitutional practice involves being willing to expose disagreement and
pluralism as well as reasoned responsiveness in a context of conflict. In The Civic Constitution, Beaumont explores instances of
civic founding in which a minority (sometimes a very tiny minority
indeed) was able, through dedicated advocacy, to challenge majority conceptions of constitutional meaning and ultimately prevail. Neither scholar sees unanimity as an especially important
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category for understanding public authority. I would have enjoyed reading more about how each scholar relates this patient
attitude towards conflict to the highly-developed conceptions of
political authority that are currently pervasive, almost all of which
identify consensus (either ideological consensus or consensus in
terms of being willing to submit to certain practices of reason-giving) as a foundation for political authority.
Both scholars also embrace, rather than resist, the tension between empirical and evaluative work at the heart of constitutional
studies. The citizens they study are ones who are self-consciously
disciplining themselves with constitutional language and values
(Beaumont’s civic founders are sophisticated constitutional
agents who are not simply bending constitutional language to
their own preferences but rather self-police with an explicit eye
towards the “constitutional mode” (p. 58)). At the same time,
these scholars are not exploring empirical social movements that
engage the Constitution’s text so much as worthwhile political
practices. While relatively positivist inquiry has its place in social
science, the aspiration towards value-neutrality also often may
obscure the straightforward (and frequently defensible) value
judgments behind scholarly research. These authors are refreshingly forthright about the value judgments resting behind the
scope of their inquiry. In Beaumont’s words, “[n]otions of founding and refounding are not purely historical, factual, or empirical
designations; they are interpretive or hermeneutic frameworks
that involve attempts to understand and explain the origins and
foundational values of our modern political community” (Beaumont, pp. 217–18). For Finn, “[e]very constitution rests upon . . .
a boundary between the spheres of public and private life, or between state and society. These categories are not just empirical
political facts . . . They are themselves objects of constitutional design,” and as such, subject to ongoing evaluation (p. 85). Both assert that, as a point of historical fact, citizens have launched political projects in the Constitution’s name—creating Jim Crow or
resisting women’s equality, for example—that the best scholarly
accounts of constitutional “tending” or “founding” should either
marginalize or outright ignore (e.g., Beaumont, p. 233; Finn, p.
165). Beaumont explicitly rejects treating movements for racial
hierarchy as “foundational” because, while they have obviously
been important, they did not help to found the “type of political
community we are and should be” (p. 224). At the same time, the
emphasis on understanding authorization practices and not just
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ideas means that each author is willing to defend forms of engagement that often leave something to be desired (as when Beaumont
cautiously traces the tensions between women suffragists and abolitionists in the context of Reconstruction Politics) (ch. 4). This is
an important departure from Kramer and Ackerman’s value-neutral or proceduralist conceptions of public authority.
The question at stake is whether highly mobilized citizens can
be “wrong” about what the Constitution means, whether their
moments of seizing public power should always be described in
terms of tending or founding, and if not, what distinguishes subversive political action from sustaining political action. This is especially important insofar as conflict is itself part of the project of
constitutional maintenance. The moderation which Beaumont,
especially, demonstrates in her selection criteria is consistent with
Rogers Smith’s appeal for scholars and citizens to self-consciously
center, in their research and advocacy, inclusive versions of the
7
many American civic traditions.
The two works have important differences. While Beaumont
explores key moments of refounding, Finn resists periodicity. For
Finn, constitutional authority derives not from key moments but
more pervasively from a “way of life” that involves citizens’ beliefs, aspirations, and importantly, practices (pp. 4, 6, 13, 175).
Finn sketches a portrait of a deliberative, active and engaged citizenry and admits that the burdens of this form of citizenship are
“weighty” (p. 97), for “the Civic Constitution seeks an active
transformation of persons into citizens,” with no “sharp, impregnable distinction” between the public and private, refusing that
liberal “liberty to be bad” (p. 97). In a series of careful essays Finn
spells out the relationship between civic constitutionalism and deliberation, justice, and “civility,” and then interrogates how a public can create, maintain, or destroy a constitutional polity. I found
civility to be one of his most interesting concepts. Finn emphasizes
that to be “civil” is not the same as to behave democratically, because “civility” includes the limitations on political life that are
part of “bonds of fellowship” and “constraints upon the democracy authority” (p. 158). Civility involves a willingness to take up
the burdens of a constitutionalist politics that is explicitly concerned with ends and outcomes (Finn references Sotirios Barber’s
8
work on constitutional welfarism in this context (p. 168)). Any
7. ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS OF
POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP (2003).
8. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
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differences between cultural tendencies in a democratic or constitutionalist polity obviously depend on how one defines these
terms in the first place, and I had some disagreement with Finn’s
understanding of democracy as majoritarianism, but in his hands
the concept of “civility” is recurrently helpful, especially in his
willingness to characterize dissident, rule-breaking, or unmannerly behavior as “civil” if it nevertheless seeks cultural accountability to constitutional commitments (p. 185).
Running throughout Peopling the Constitution is an ongoing
contrast between the Civic Constitution and the Juridical one, and
here I disagreed with the author. The “Juridical Constitution” is,
for Finn, associated with private liberal individualism (p. 80), with
Constitution “worship” (p. 116), with judicial supremacy (p. 133),
with constitutional settlement rather than dialogue (p. 133), and
in general with an atrophy of public debate (p. 133). Finn
acknowledges that the Juridical Constitution is equally rooted in
the Constitution’s text (p. 88), but rejects Juridical constitutionalism because the responsibilities it delineates for citizens are
“sharply limited—paying taxes, reporting for jury service, and
voting”—such that “citizenship is an occasional, part-time practice,” and an exercise of power always only mediated by representation (p. 96). He worries that the public’s felt responsibility for
constitutional deliberation might be merely “ceremonious” (p.
157) if publics imagine that deliberation is only the Court’s
work—a phenomenon Mark Tushnet names judicial "overhang"
(p. 133).
Analytically this seems to me not quite right. The boldest
9
statements of judicial supremacy—Cooper v. Aaron, Planned
10
11
Parenthood v. Casey, City of Boerne v. Flores —involve a Court
struggling to make itself heard in a thicket of political opposition.
It is hard to claim that the Court’s statements of supremacy in
these cases were politically decisive. If these cases represent the
Court’s preferred outcome, then it is worth noticing that in no
area has that outcome actually prevailed (desegregated schools,
reasonable and pervasive access to abortion rights, or the immunity of generally applicable federal legislation to special challenge
by religious groups)—to say nothing of being “settled.” Are the
Court’s cries of supremacy really the last word or are they the
shout of a political institution that believes it is losing its grip?
9.
10.
11.

358 U.S. 1 (1958).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Consider that Louis Seidman, a legal theorist of unsettlement, celebrates strong statements of judicial authority precisely for the
12
backlash that they can create.
One might also respond that most citizens easily shrug off
weighty constitutional responsibilities with a much easier excuse
than judicial overhang. Most citizens, even very active ones, have
so many other valuable things to do. Raising families, earning a
wage, playing sports, creating community, appreciating the sacred, and being sociable can be wonderful activities even if not
disciplined by the project of maintaining a particular constitutional order. Where does this fit into Finn’s demanding republicanism? Are citizens who would rather pursue hobbies, make art,
work hard, invest money, and raise children forever destined to
be governed by predators? Finn offers little confidence that almost any of this work can be safely delegated to representatives
or to legal professionals and I wonder if, given the centrality of
representation and legal structures to the constitutional text, Finn
hasn’t painted a portrait of a Constitution at war with itself (p.
169).
The next question that both works raise for me is about the
structure of the public spheres that have transformed constitutional meaning. I think each author has made a serious contribution here and I hope other scholars will take up the agenda that
these books set. Beaumont is clear that she is studying how a disciplined, structured associational life has enabled subjects to claim
power and create textual meaning that includes them in the burdens and privileges of governing (pp. 11, 14). She is persuasive
that subjects have had to creatively re-imagine social and political
structures to re-found an order that will generate outcomes inclusive of them. At the same time, in a social movement, not every
citizen participates in the same way (p. 152). And, while constitutional language may prompt the formation of responsive public
constituencies, some language has been less generative than other
language. Consider the difference between mobilization around
the Second Amendment and mobilization around the guarantee
of a “republican form of government” for the states (p. 208). If
“the public” (p. 41) really is a diverse and disciplined array of associations rather than a mass—then what is the relationship between the structure of that sphere, and constitutional outcomes?
Can we note any general tendencies or systematic relationships?
12. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW
DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 144–216 (2001).
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Vast literatures in law and political science interrogate the systematic relationships between the membership, behavior, and
rules of institutions to the outcomes they generate. If the public is
more like an institution than a mass, then constitutional scholars
should interrogate its characteristic features and behavior as we
do for other institutions.
I would be especially interested to learn more about the effects of class and economic hierarchy on the structure of the public sphere and on constitutional outcomes. In fact, on the basis of
Beaumont’s work (which highlights the incredibly high burdens
placed on would-be constitutional founders) and from Finn’s demanding republicanism, the books lead me to wonder whether the
very notion of civic constitutionalism might be at odds with the
constitutional text insofar as that text entrenches an elitist commercial republic.
The political effects of class hierarchy are vast. And class hierarchy may well be grounded in the Constitution itself: Stephen
Elkin’s work on the “commercial republic” make it clear that the
Constitution’s commitment to the blessings of liberty, free trade,
and a national legislature empowered to enable commerce will
13
generate some kind of economic elite. These values are reinforced by a complex, highly mediated representational structure
that privileges the wealthy in terms of influence, access, and of14
fice-holding. This complex system filters out many potentially
successful political movements, but arguably has its strongest effect on class politics. A constitutional commitment to generating
wealth without a corresponding textual concern for wealth distribution generates pressing problems of inclusion. Neither Beaumont nor Finn interrogates the expectation of some of the framers
that the Constitution will generate an economic elite which would
then disproportionately hold the reigns of social and political
power. Neither work interrogates the way constitutional structures generate hierarchy or the relative impermeability of constitutional institutions to class-based politics. Finn even transforms
Madison’s class anxiety (the famous logic of demobilization in the
Federalist Papers) into an anxiety about judicial supremacy (p.
73). In general, I found myself wanting to hear more details about

13. STEPHEN L. ELKIN, RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC:
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AFTER MADISON 19–73 (2006).
14. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008).
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the structure of the public spheres that, according to these authors, hold so much constitutional authority and in particular I
wanted to hear about economic hierarchy within that structure.
Reading these two books together also raises some interesting questions about intellectual or ideological divisions of labor in
public mobilizations. Beaumont is clear that in a social movement,
many citizens will participate, but not every citizen participates in
the same way. When assessing the constitutional authority of a
movement, she turns to its most highly developed constitutional
articulations, not to whether each individual within that movement could offer a cogent, rational, developed justification for
their politics. This is in sharp contrast to Finn’s account of civic
authority, which seems to demand that, to make a real contribution to constitutional culture, a movement must be constituted entirely of individuals who are not only active and present, but also
each and every one of them familiar with the precise constitutional vocabularies that are a part of the movements they support.
In general, for Finn, representation and delegation (either from
publics to institutions, or from one public to other publics) appear
as dead-end streets. I find Beaumont’s approach more appropriately political. Isn’t there room in an “ideal” movement for folks
to help bake pies, walk door-to-door, or circulate newspapers
without needing to think through the precise ins-and-outs of, say,
the extent to which the Fugitive Persons Clause mandates national rather than state authority over the meaning of due process? Is it enough for some, indeed many participants to know, to
feel, that slavery is wrong and to want to do something about it,
without concerning themselves too much about the extent of executive power in the states? Should scholars really claim that the
abolitionist movement—which pulled off perhaps the single most
successful constitutional transformation, by any terms, of any
movement – was less than ideal if not every participant had
thought through the Lysander Spooner—Frederick Douglass—
William Lloyd Garrison—John Brown debate? The civic founders and tenders of our nation’s history haven’t necessarily all been
participants in all of the many diverse forms of labor demanded
by their movements. To the extent that there is division of labor,
and to the extent that that division is acceptable, I wonder about
its terms. To what extent did these movements feature separation
between their material work—baking pies, printing newspapers,
and the like—and the ideological labor of developing arguments,
generating new ideas and new language? How did economic class
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and gender structure these divisions? How deeply did constitutional language and ideation saturate the discourse of these movements?

